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INTRODUCTION

Ocean acidification will have profound effects on the entire
human population and natural resources that depend in any
way upon Earth’s oceans and lakes. In turn, those effects will
be even greater, and potentially catastrophic, for indigenous
populations who rely on the seas for physical, cultural, and
spiritual sustenance. While most research on carbon dioxide
absorption from the atmosphere has focused on oceans and the
resulting acidification, many believe that acidification levels
also will also increase in the Great Lakes.1 Indian tribes in the
Pacific Northwest and the Great Lakes regions share reliance

 Professor of Law and Director, Native American Law Center, University of
Washington School of Law; Oneida Indian Nation Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard
Law School (2009-2020).
1. Brian Bienkowski, Acidification is not just for oceans—the Great Lakes could
acidify, too, as our carbon emissions increase. Here’s why you should take note. THE
DAILY CLIMATE (December 8, 2015), http://www.dailyclimate.org/tdc-newsroom/2015/
12/forgetting-freshwater-could-the-great-lakes-be. NOAA OCEAN ACIDIFICATION
STEERING COMM., NOAA OCEAN AND GREAT LAKES ACIDIFICATION RESEARCH PLAN:
SPECIAL REPORT 107 (2010), http://www.nodc.noaa.gov/media/pdf/oceanacidification/
NOAA_OA_Steering2010.pdf (last visited April 24, 2016).
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on marine and freshwater resources, and many treaties
contain provisions reserving off-reservation access to these
resources.2 These treaties have consistently been interpreted
as the Indians would have understood them, with any
ambiguities interpreted in favor of the tribes.3 While many
tribes have fought off incursions on their territories and treaty
rights in particular cases, the threats from greenhouse gases
and ocean acidification call for even greater efforts due to
extensive tribal rights in affected waters and resources.4 This
battle also requires a major effort on the part of the United
States government.
Each article in this book details the problem of ocean
acidification, which as Professor Hull describes, is also known
as climate change’s “evil twin.”5 Professor Mary Wood describe
the Atmospheric Trust Litigation effort to force “urgent
emission reductions around the world,”6 while Jaqueline M.
Bertelsen draws specific attention to the federal government’s
obligation to protect the Tulalip Tribes’ access to shellfish beds,
and makes specific recommendations for federal and state
actions to accomplish that end.7 Others offer a creative array of
legal and policy arguments to deal with this escalating problem
threatening the most important natural resource on the

2. See Treaty with the Yakamas art. 3, 1855, 12 Stat. 951 (“The exclusive right of
taking fish in all the streams, where running through or bordering said reservation, is
further secured to said confederated tribes and bands of Indians, as also the right of
taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common with the citizens of the
Territory, and of erecting temporary buildings for curing them; together with the
privilege of hunting, gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their horses and cattle
upon open and unclaimed land.”); Treaty with the Lake Superior Chippewa, art. 11, 10
Stat. 1109 (“And such of them as reside in the territory hereby ceded, shall have the
right to hunt and fish therein, until otherwise ordered by the President.”).
3. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999);
Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Fishing Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443
U.S. 658 (1979).
4. See Fawn Sharp, Tribes have up close perspective on climate change, THE SEATTLE
TIMES (April 23, 2016), http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/tribes-have-up-close-per
spective-on-climate-change/.
5. Robin Kundis Craig, Dealing with Ocean Acidification: The Problem, The Clean
Water Act, and State and Regional Approaches, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1583, 1585 (2015).
6. Mary Christina Wood & Charles W. Woodward, IV, Atmospheric Trust Litigation
and the Constitutional Right to a Healthy Climate System: Judicial Recognition at
Last, 6 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 633 (2016).
7. Jaqueline M. Bertelsen, “Fed” Up with Acidification: “Trusting” the Federal
Government to Protect the Tulalip Tribes’ Access to Shellfish Beds, 6 WASH. J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 495 (2016).
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planet.8 All of these approaches, if followed, may help a bad
situation from getting worse. The United States must consider
the effects of any action, or inaction, upon Indian treaty rights
and resources. Federal law does not permit abrogation of
Indian
treaty
rights
absent
express
congressional
authorization,9 and third-party interference with treaty rights
is not permitted.10 Federal permitting processes that may
adversely affect treaty resources must take place in
consultation with the affected tribes, and be consistent with
the federal government’s trust responsibility.
This essay describes the nature of Indian treaty rights and
the federal-tribal relationship, shows how the United States
has sometimes acted to protect Indian treaty rights, and
argues that the United States must do more to protect and
enhance environmental conditions that are causing ocean
acidification. Tribal property rights secured by treaty, and the
federal government’s trust responsibility require serious
protective action by the United States to stop the increase in
ocean and freshwater acidification. Part II describes the
federal-tribal relationship and the parameters of the federal
trust responsibility. Part III reviews legal authority supporting
federal litigation and administrative actions to protect Indian
treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather and to the habitat upon
which those rights depend. Part IV concludes the piece with a
normative discussion of why the federal trust responsibility
requires the robust use of protective, proactive, and
ameliorative efforts outlined by others in this book. In sum, it
will take a broader view of the trust responsibility and more
aggressive action by policy makers to force limitations on
greenhouse gas emissions and stem the harm from increasing
ocean acidification.
II.

THE FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY

A.

Background

The United States’ trust responsibility has its roots in
international law and treaties and agreements made between
8. See Ryan P. Kelly & Margaret R. Caldwell, Ten Ways States Can Combat Ocean
Acidification(And Why They Should), 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 57 (2013).
9. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
10. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
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the United States and indigenous Nations.11 European nations
that explored and came to what is now the United States,
asserted exclusive rights to deal with the Indigenous Nations
in matters related to land and intergovernmental relations.
This assertion of authority was largely designed to resolve
competition between the European Nations and could not
affect the status of Indian nations as pre-existing sovereigns.
When the United States Constitution was adopted, the federal
government assumed exclusive authority in all matters related
to Indian affairs, and got to work on the colonization process.
Nearly fifty years later, Supreme Court Chief Justice John
Marshall stated that the “Indian nations had always been
considered as distinct, independent political communities,
retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed
possessors of the soil, from time immemorial.”12 The Supreme
Court in 2004 noted that “at least during the first century of
America’s national existence . . . Indian affairs were more an
aspect of military and foreign policy than a subject of domestic
or municipal law.”13 A look back in time reveals that Indian
nations and the United States government have a sovereign-tosovereign relationship evidenced by the Constitution,14
treaties,15 agreements,16 acts of Congress,17 and court
decisions.18 The federal trust responsibility is derived from all
these sources, as well as their international law antecedents.
While the earliest treaties reflected a desire for mutual
peace and intergovernmental respect, as a practical matter the
tribes were made subject to various federal laws without
regard to tribal desires.19 This colonial treatment of indigenous
11. See generally NELL J. NEWTON & ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §§ 5.04, 5.05 (Newton et al., 2012 ed. 2012).
12. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 558 (1832).
13. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15. See, e.g., Treaty with the Yakamas, and Treaty with the Lake Superior
Chippewa, supra note 2.
16. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1906) (discussing agreement ratified
by Congress). CHARLES WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW (1986)
(discussing treaty substitutes utilized after 1871).
17. Act June 30, 1834, c. 161, § 12, 4 Stat. 730 (codified in part at 25 U.S.C. § 177)
(restricting sale of Indian land without federal approval); American Indian Trust Fund
Management Reform Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4061.
18. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1942).
19. See Robert T. Anderson, Treaty Substitutes in the Modern Era, ch. 11, in T HE
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peoples was geared toward the United States’ acquisition of
land for westward expansion.20 In return, the United States
provided compensation in various forms. Most important from
the Indian perspective were the promises of permanent
homelands, access to natural resources, and recognition of the
right to continue to exist as distinct sovereign peoples. The
Supreme Court noted that although the federal government
and others had colonized the United States, the law of nations
mandated that the Indian tribes were owed a duty of
protection from incursions on tribal governmental authority
and independence within the newly formed nation.21 These
rights were to be safeguarded, and supported, by the United
States, especially from interference by the states. The
government-to-government relationship and these promises of
political allegiance remain at the foundation of the federal
trust responsibility despite vacillating federal policies. The
initial respect for tribal territories was eroded with the
President Andrew Jackson’s removal policy, which was effected
by a number of actions—the most infamous of which is the
Trail of Tears.22 allotment of tribal lands, and the associated
loss of approximately ninety million acres of tribal land by
1934.23 Congress returned to the public domain lands that
were considered “surplus” to Indian needs.24 While previous
reservations were generally under exclusive tribal ownership,
the new allotment policies allowed an influx of non-Indians
within reservation boundaries. This resulted in a checkerboard
pattern of land ownership within reservations and introduced
many of today’s vexing jurisdictional problems.25

P OWER OF P ROMISES , R ETHINKING I NDIAN T REATIES IN THE P ACIFIC
N ORTHWEST , (Alexandra Harmon ed., 2008); see also CHARLES F. WILKINSON,
MESSAGES FROM FRANKS’ LANDING: A STORY OF SALMON TREATIES, AND THE INDIAN
WAY 11, 14 (2000).
20. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 197–98 (1999)
(describing treaty negotiations in Minnesota, and quoting “statement of Hole-in-theDay, the principal negotiator for the Chippewa: ‘Your words strike us in this way. They
are very short. “I want to buy your land.” These words are very expressive—very curt.’
”).
21. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
22. See ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTARY 50–55, 74–77 (3d ed. 2015).
23. See Judith K. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 10–12 (1995).
24. See, e.g., Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
25. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
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Congress reversed course with the adoption of the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA) in 1934—sometimes known as the
Indian “New Deal.”26 The IRA “halted further allotments and
extended indefinitely the existing periods of trust applicable to
already allotted Indian lands.”27 This return to support of
tribal self-government and a secure Indian land base was
short-lived, however, as less than twenty years later, Congress
adopted a resolution calling for the “termination” of the
federal-tribal relationship with certain Indian tribes.28
Although the termination period quickly fell into disfavor, its
short tenure resulted in the end of the government-togovernment relationship between the United States and over
seventy federally recognized Indian tribes, and transferred
jurisdiction over those tribes to the states.29 This state control
turned the historic federal-tribal relationship on its head.
States began aggressively to assert jurisdiction over Indian
country through laws such as Public Law. 280, which gave
selected states full criminal and some civil jurisdiction over
Indian county—without regard to tribal desires.30
Although federal policies changed over time from the
reservation system, to removal, to allotment and assimilation
era, and then to outright termination of the federal-tribal

U.S. 408 (1989); Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351
(1962); Royster, supra note 23, at 1.
26. Wheeler-Howard Act, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 461–79).
27. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (On and after June 18, 1934, no land of any Indian reservation,
created or set apart by treaty or agreement with the Indians, Act of Congress,
Executive order, purchase, or otherwise, shall be allotted in severalty to any Indian.).
See Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502
U.S. 251, 255 (1992).
28. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953) (directing the Secretary of the Interior to
recommend tribes for termination). See NEWTON & ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 11,
§ 1.06, at 95. In general, “[termination] would mean that Indian tribes would
eventually lose any special standing they had under Federal law: the tax exempt
status of their lands would be discontinued; Federal responsibility for their economic
and social well-being would be repudiated; and the tribes themselves would be
effectively dismantled.” Richard M. Nixon, Special Message to Congress on Indian
Affairs (July 8, 1970), H.R. Doc. 91-363, at 1. But see Menominee Tribe v. United
States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (termination of Menominee Indian Tribe did not abrogate
tribal rights to hunt and fish free of state regulation).
29. See NEWTON & ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 11, § 1.06, at 95.
30. See generally Robert T. Anderson, Negotiating Jurisdiction: Retroceding State
Authority over Indian Country Granted by Public Law 280, 87 WASH. L. REV. 915
(2012).
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relationship, since 1970 the federal policy is one of Indian selfdetermination without termination. This modern policy
implements the federal government’s trust responsibility to
protect and advance Indian Nations’ status as governments
with inherent sovereignty. Indian reservations have come to be
regarded permanent tribal homelands with President Nixon’s
1970 address rejecting the forced termination policy described
the nature of the federal-tribal relationship.
The policy of forced termination is wrong in my
judgment, for a number of reasons. First, the premises
on which it rests are wrong. Termination implies that
the Federal government has taken on a trusteeship for
Indian communities as an act of generosity toward a
disadvantaged people and that can therefore
discontinue this responsibility on a unilateral basis
whenever it sees fit. But the unique status of Indian
tribes does not rest on any premise such as this. The
special relationship between Indians and the federal
government is the result of solemn obligations, which
have been entered into by the United States
Government. Down through the years, through written
treaties and through formal and informal agreements,
our government has made specific commitments to the
Indian people. For their part, the Indians have often
surrendered claims to vast tracts of land and have
accepted life on government reservations. In exchange,
the government has agreed to provide community
services such as health, education and public safety,
services that would presumably allow Indian
communities to enjoy a standard of living comparable to
that of other Americans.31
The Supreme Court has concluded that the United States
“has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest
responsibility and trust.”32 Since then, the American Indian
Policy Review Commission (AIPRC) was established by a
resolution of Congress in 1973 to review all aspects of Indian
law and policy, including the federal trust responsibility.33 The
Final Report of the AIPRC carefully evaluated the trust
31. Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, Special Message on Indian
Affairs (July 8, 1970).
32. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1942).
33. S.J. Res. 133, 93rd Cong. (1973).
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responsibility and described it as “a rather confusing legal
concept with murky origins and inexact application.”34 The
Final Report noted that the National Tribal Chairman’s
Association categorized the trust responsibility as including: 1)
protection and proper management of Indian resources,
properties and assets; 2) protections and support of tribal
sovereignty; and 3) provision of community and social services
to tribal members.35 This characterization is consistent with
the AIPRC Final Report’s evaluation of the federal trust, and
was relied upon by the Commission for a variety of
recommendations for federal implementation of the trust
responsibility in the modern era. These recommendations
sparked a remarkable congressional response—one unheard of
in any era of federal Indian policy. Over a dozen federal
statutes were developed in consultation with Indian tribes
intended to promote economic self-sufficiency, and to protect
tribal natural resources and the distinct sovereign status of
Indian nations and their people.36
More recently, in 2009, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar
appointed a five member Commission on Indian Trust
Administration and Reform to carry out a comprehensive
review of the Interior Department’s performance in carrying

34. AM. INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM’N, FINAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS
MAY 17, 1977, at 125 (1977).
35. AM. INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM’N, REPORT ON TRUST RESPONSIBILITIES AND
THE FEDERAL-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP 47 (1976).
36. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act (ISDEA) of
1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq. (amended by the Tribal Self-Governance Acts of 1988,
1994, and 2000, 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aa to 458aaa-18); Tribally Controlled Schools Act of
1988, 25 U.S.C. § 2501 et seq.; Tribally Controlled Colleges and Universities Act of
1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.; Native American Housing Assistance SelfDetermination Act of 1996, 25 U.S.C. § 4101 et seq.; Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25
U.S.C. § 1415 et seq.; Indian Forest Resources Management Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3101–
3120; Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2108; Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721; Tribal Treatment as State under the
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, 42 U.S.C. § 7474(c) (Clean Air Act), 33 U.S.C. §
1377(e) (Clean Water Act); Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1931;
American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996; Native American
Languages Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2906; Native American Grave Protection
and Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA), 18 U.S.C. § 1170, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013;
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. Law 111-211, 111th Cong. 2d Sess., 124 Stat.
2258, 2261–2301; Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible Tribal Home Ownership
Act of 2012, amending 25 U.S.C. § 415; Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act,
Pub. L. 113-4, Title IX, § 904, 127 Stat. 120 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304).
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out federal trust responsibilities.37 The Commission’s Report
noted that, “in the past, the trust responsibility was viewed as
a demeaning and paternalistic guardian-ward relationship.
That model is unsuited for the modern self-determination era,
but . . . the outmoded trust model still influences the
performance of the federal government’s obligations to Indian
nations and people in some cases.”38 The Commission
concluded:
It is critical that the United States continue to
acknowledge its historic legal and moral obligations to
Indian nations to further the sovereign-to-sovereign
relationship at the foundation of the many complex
dealings that occur on a regular basis. It must be
remembered that the United States would not exist but
for the acquisition of tribal territories that were given
in exchange for the continued support and respect of the
federal government. The promises of permanent
homelands and recognition of the right to continue to
exist as distinct sovereign peoples impose solemn
obligations on all branches of the federal government.39
Unfortunately, the federal government does not always live
up to the Commission’s proposed standard. This is because the
United States vigorously defends itself when Indian tribes
bring suit against seeking monetary compensation for harm
allegedly caused by federal agencies to tribal financial or
natural resources. In so doing, the United States sometimes
avoids monetary liability in tribal breach of trust actions. The
Supreme Court has opined that the federal trust responsibility
is sometimes different than a private trust, and that common
law trust duties do not apply to the United States under all
circumstances. This has created a mistaken impression that
the federal government is relieved of obligations to protect
treaty resources from third party harm. As set out in the next
section, the line of cases limiting federal liability has no

37. Order 3292 (Dep’t of the Interior, December 8, 2009). The author of this chapter
was a member of the Commission and co-author of the Report.
38. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INDIAN TRUST
ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM, FINAL REPORT, APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION (2013),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/cobell/commission/upload/Report-ofthe-Commission-on-Indian-Trust-Administration-and-Reform_FINAL_Approved-1210-2013.pdf.
39. Id. at 33.
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application to consideration of prospective actions to protect
treaty resources—a topic considered in Part III.
B.

Federal Trust Liability Standards

Private trusts are different from the complex federal-tribal
relationship in a number of ways. A leading legal treatise
describes a trust “as a fiduciary relationship in which one
person holds a property interest, subject to an equitable
obligation to keep or use that interest for the benefit of
another.”40 The basic elements of a private trust include: 1)
trust property held for the benefit of another; 2) a settlor who
creates the trust; 3) a trustee who holds the property for
another; 4) a beneficiary for whom the property is managed;
and 5) a trust instrument which defines the purpose of the
trust and duties of the trustee and rights of the beneficiary.41
The trustee is a fiduciary from which the law demands an
unusually high standard of ethical or moral conduct with
reference to the beneficiary. Trustees owe a duty to act solely
in the interest of the beneficiary, and must not consider their
own personal advantage.42
While the property holding aspects of a private trustee are
analogous in some ways to the federal-tribal trusteeship, the
elements of a private trust cannot support the full realm of
responsibilities embodied in federal trusteeship to Indian
peoples. Private trust principles, however, provide appropriate
guidance when the federal government is exercising
management responsibilities for real property, and natural
resources that it holds in trust for Indian tribes.43
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted
the federal trust responsibility when it evaluates federal
monetary liability for the breach of trust obligations.44 In the
case of United States v. Navajo Nation,45 the Court considered
claims that the Secretary of the Interior and the Bureau of
40. George G. Bogert & Amy M. Hess, Trusts and Trustees, ch. 1, § 1 (3d ed. 2007).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 475 (2003)
(fundamental common law duty of trustee is to preserve and maintain trust assets).
44. The Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (waives federal sovereign immunity for
money damages claims against the United States).
45. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003).
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Indian Affairs (BIA) failed to act in the Navajo’s best interest
in the renewal of an expired coal lease between the Navajo and
the Peabody Coal Company. The newly negotiated lease called
for a twenty percent royalty, but could become effective only
with the approval of the BIA. The Secretary privately met with
a Peabody Coal Company representative and agreed to direct
the BIA to delay lease approval.46 Laboring under the
erroneous belief that the BIA (as opposed to the Secretary) was
not inclined to approve the lease with a twenty percent royalty,
the tribe agreed to a twelve percent royalty. The Court refused
to award damages to the Navajo Nation to despite the
unfaithful actions that resulted in a financial disadvantage to
the Navajo Nation, in the form of an 8% reduction in the
negotiated royalty.47 The Court reasoned that “there is no
textual basis for concluding that the Secretary’s approval
function includes a duty, enforceable in an action for money
damages, to ensure a higher rate of return for the Tribe
concerned.”48 In a second decision after the tribe prevailed on
remand, the Court again rejected the Navajo Nation’s claims,
and explained the test for determining when the United States
is liable for damages in breach of trust cases.
[T]here are thus two hurdles that must be cleared
before a tribe can invoke jurisdiction under the Indian
Tucker Act. First, the tribe must identify a substantive
source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or other
duties, and allege that the Government has failed
faithfully to perform those duties. If that threshold is
passed, the court must then determine whether the
relevant source of substantive law can fairly be
interpreted as mandating compensation for damages
sustained as a result of a breach of the duties [the
governing law] impose[s]. At the second stage,
principles of trust law might be relevant in drawing the
inference that Congress intended damages to remedy a
breach.49

46. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 497.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 511.
49. United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 290–91 (2009). See also Fletcher v.
United States, 730 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2013) (“So when Congress says the
government may be called to account, we have some reason to think it means to allow
the relevant Native American beneficiaries to sue for an accounting, just as traditional
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The federal government has sometimes rested on this
narrow standard to refuse to protect tribal resources from
prospective harm, and to resist tribal efforts to compel agency
action.50 As one respected commentator noted, “The trust
responsibility should play a role in protecting tribal lands and
resources, but the trust doctrine stands in potential jeopardy
today as courts collapse protective trust requirements into
statutory standards.”51 Professor Wood’s observation regarding
the protective trust standards relates only to the question of
federal court actions seeking to force the federal government to
take protective actions. Whether or not courts are willing to
force the United States to bring such protective actions is an
important question, but the larger point is that the federal
government’s good faith obligations should lead it to take
protective actions involving tribal resources even if not
compelled by the courts. As stated in the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787: “the utmost good faith shall always be observed
towards Indians; their land and property shall never be taken
from them without their consent.”52 The federal government
has in fact brought many actions to protect Indian treaty
rights—both to harvest resources and to preserve habitat.
Federal agencies have also stepped up in recent times to
protect Indian treaty rights and associated habitat. As
discussed in the concluding section III, these sorts of actions
will be especially important in combatting climate change and
associated acidification of the Ocean and freshwater lakes.
III. PROTECTING INDIAN TREATY RIGHTS
Indian treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather are property

trust beneficiaries are permitted to do.”); NEWTON & ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 11,
at 428 (“Private trust law principles are most often invoked in controversies involving
direct management of tribal resources and funds.”).
50. See, e.g., Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States, 469 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 2006) (no
judicially enforceable general duty to manage non-tribal resources so as not to harm
tribal resources). See also NEWTON & ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.05[3][c], at
431 (“In the absence of specific statutory duties, federal agencies discharge their trust
responsibility if they comply with the statutes and general regulations.”).
51. Mary C. Wood, The Federal Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal Lands and
Resources Through Claims of Injunctive Relief against Federal Agencies, 39 TULSA L.
REV. 355, 356 (2003).
52. 32 J. Cont’l Cong. 340–41 (1787).
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rights protected under federal law.53 Off-reservation hunting,
fishing, and gathering rights are servitudes over the burdened
lands. In a number of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has
interpreted treaties to contain the implied rights necessary to
exercise a treaty’s explicit or substantive provisions. For
example, in United States v. Winans,54 the Court confirmed
that tribal members possess an easement of access over
privately held land as necessary to the exercise of treaty
hunting, fishing, and gathering rights. The Court specifically
held that an access easement was necessarily implied from the
treaties’ specific reservation of fishing rights at a usual and
accustomed station. This principle ensures that reserved treaty
rights are not rendered a nullity by shifting patterns of
property ownership and development.55
Similarly, in Winters v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that when the federal government set aside land for the
Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana, it impliedly
reserved sufficient water from the Milk River to fulfill its
purpose for creating the reservation, which was to provide a
permanent tribal homeland with an agricultural economy.56
Since Winters, courts addressing tribal reserved water rights
for fisheries have recognized habitat protection as the basis for
Indian reserved water rights.57 In the Adair and Walton I
decisions, the courts recognized the obvious fact that the
reserved treaty rights to fish on rivers and gather aquatic
plants require the presence of sufficient water to maintain the
rivers, lakes, and marshes upon which the plants and fisheries

53. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443
U.S. 658 (1979); Menominee Indian Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). See
slso NEWTON & ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 11, § 18.02, p. 1156.
54. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381–382 (1905).
55. Id.
56. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908). For a comprehensive review
of the Indian reserved rights doctrine, see NEWTON & ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 11, §
19.03.
57. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414–1415 (9th Cir. 1983) (“confirm[ing]
to the Tribe the amount of water necessary to support its hunting and fishing rights”);
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton (Walton I), 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir. 1981)
(awarding amount of water “necessary to maintain” on-reservation fishery). See Robert
T. Anderson, Water Rights, Water Quality, and Regulatory Jurisdiction in Indian
Country, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 195, 205–14 (2015) (summarizing the law of Indian
reserved rights); NEWTON & ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 11.
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depend.58 These Indian reserved rights are property rights
with a priority dage of time immemorial,59 and thus are
superior in rank to any water rights crated under other state
or federal law. Federal and state agencies as well as private
parties may not interefere with these in situ water rights.
Moreover, the federal trust responsibility requires that the
United States protect these rights.60
Neither states, nor private property owners may bar tribal
access to areas subject to treaty hunting, fishing, and
gathering rights.61 This principle also applies to federal
agencies.62 The United States’ trust responsibility extends not
just to the Department of the Interior, but to the federal
government as a whole. This responsibility includes duties to
protect tribal assets and property from damage by third
parties.63 Thus, all federal agencies, including the Army Corps

58. Id. See also In re Yakima River Drainage Basin, 296 P.3d 835, 840 (Wash. 2013)
(en banc) (“[The] nation also has a right that dates from time immemorial to adequate
water to sustain fish and other aquatic life in Ahtanum Creek [which extends
beyond reservation lands].”); State Dep’t of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation Irrigation
Dist, 850 P.2d 1306, 1317 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (“All of the parties to this litigation
agree that the Yakima Indians are entitled to water for irrigation purposes and, at least
at one time, were entitled to water for the preservation of fishing rights. The
disagreement here is the extent of the treaty rights remaining.”). See, e.g., Joint Bd.
of Control of Flathead Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 832 F.2d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.
1987) (reversing trial court’s refusal to issue injunction to protect tribal water rights
for fish); Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 763 F.2d 1032
(9th Cir. 1985) (holding district court acted appropriately in ordering release of water
to protect habitat for the fishery); United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D.
Wash. 1982), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing a
reserved tribal water right for water needed to maintain favorable temperature
conditions to support the fishery); State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 712 P.2d 754, 764–66 (Mont. 1985)
(recognizing that tribal reserved rights may include water for fisheries as well as
agriculture and other purposes).
59. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1413–15. See NEWTON & ANDERSON ET AL., supra, note 11.
60. Criteria and Procedures for Indian Water Rights Settlements, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223
(1990) (“Indian water rights are vested property rights for which the United States has
a trust responsibility, with the United States holding legal title to such water in trust
for the benefit of the Indians.”).
61. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381, 384.
62. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F.
Supp. 553 (D. Or. 1977) (Army Corps of Engineers may not construct dam that will
destroy usual and accustomed fishing stations without express authorization by
Congress).
63. See Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539, 546–47 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[Commerce]
Secretary Brown issued emergency regulations to conserve salmon runs and to ensure
consistency with ‘any other applicable law,’ which includes the Tribes’ federally
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of Engineers, Department of Commerce, and Coast Guard,
shoulder the same consultation and trust responsibilities as
the Department of the Interior.64 As one commentator notes,
however, existence of the trust responsibility has not prevented
massive damage to natural resources upon which tribes
depend. “In recent decades, federal agencies have developed a
myriad of “government to government” relationships with
tribes and have created policies to carry out their trust
obligation. Such policies, however, have generally failed to
ensure protection of tribal interests.”65 As discussed below,
however, the United States has in fact brought many cases
before the courts to protect Indian treaty rights and has an
improving record in agency decision-making that protects or
accommodates Indian treaty rights.
A number of federal courts have also ruled that protection of
Indian treaty rights can preclude federal or state action that
could adversely affect those rights by harming species’ habitat,
or the places at which the tribes are entitled to exercise their
rights.66 Like the implied rights recognized in United States v.
reserved fishing rights.”).
64. Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000). See also President
Barack Obama, Tribal Consultation Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,879 (Nov. 5, 2009) (reiterating Exec. Order
No. 13,175 and ordering all agency heads to report to OMB with detailed plans for
compliance with Exec. Order No. 13,175); Executive Order Establishing the White
House Counsel on Native American Affairs, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,539 (June 26, 2013) (“This
order establishes a national policy to ensure that the Federal Government engages in a
true and lasting government-to-government relationship with federally recognized
tribes in a more coordinated and effective manner, including by better carrying out its
trust responsibilities.”).
65. Mary Christina Wood & Zachary Welcker, Tribes As Trustees Again (Part I): The
Emerging Tribal Role in the Conservation Trust Movement, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
373, 387–88 (2008). Professor Wood provides a scathing review of the United States’
actions toward tribal interests. “The federal government has ignored its trust
obligation time and time again and actively resists any judicial enforcement of the
trust in pending court cases. Litigation to protect harvest resources has failed largely
due to the deference courts give to agencies.” Id. at 393 (footnotes and citations
omitted).
66. See Umatilla v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553 (D. Or. 1977) (duty to protect fish
and fishing rights reserved by treaties applies to federal agencies as well as state and
local governments; Army Corps of Engineers may not destroy fishing grounds absent
authorization by Congress); No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334, 372–73 (W.D.
Wash. 1981) (ordering hearing on whether sedimentation caused by proposed oil
pipeline would adversely affect spawning habitat); United States v. Anderson, 736
F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding the Tribe has a right of sufficient water quality and
quantity to preserve fishing); Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation
Dist., 763 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding district court’s finding that

488 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 6:2

Winans and Winters v. United States,67 in Muckleshoot Indian
Tribe v. Hall, a federal district court enjoined construction of a
marina in Elliott Bay that would eliminate a portion of the
tribe’s usual and accustomed fishing site.68 The court rejected
arguments by the Corps of Engineers, along with public and
private developers, that there would be a de minimis effect on
tribal treaty rights.
No case has been presented to this Court holding that it
is permissible to take a small portion of a tribal usual
and accustomed fishing ground, as opposed to a large
portion, without an act of Congress, or to permit
limitation of access to a tribal fishing place for a
purpose other than conservation. In Umatilla, the court
refused to permit an unauthorized taking of some, not
all, of the fishing stations which would be flooded by the
proposed dam’s two and one-half mile reservoir on
Catherine Creek. 440 F. Supp. at 555. In Oregon, the
States’ proposed restriction of treaty fishing would have
eliminated two pools in the upper half of the Columbia
River zone at issue, and left the tribes access to a 21.6–
mile pool and one hatchery. 718 F.2d at 301–02. In
Winans, one fishing station on the Columbia River was
at issue. 198 U.S. at 371. In each of these cases, the
court did not allow the tribes’ right of access to their
usual and accustomed fishing places to be impaired,
limited or eliminated and did not indicate that the
extent or amount of damage to the property right was a
factor to weigh in reaching its decision.69
The Army Corps took the court’s admonitions seriously, and
in N.W. Sea Farms, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,70 the
district court upheld the denial of a federal permit to construct
net pens for a fish farm at a Lummi Nation usual and
Bureau of Reclamation had authority to release water from project to protect treaty
fish habitat from dewatering). See also Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v.
Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D. D.C. 1972 and 1973) (holding the Secretary of Interior is
required to provide all water possible to Pyramid Lake to preserve fish depended upon
by the Tribe, after fulfilling requirement of earlier decrees and contracts).
67. See supra notes 56 & 57 and accompanying text.
68. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504, 1515–16 (W.D. Wash.
1988).
69. Id. at 1515.
70. N.W. Sea Farms v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 931 F. Supp. 1515, 1521–22 (W.D.
Wash. 1996).
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accustomed fishing place. The court found that it is the Corps’
fiduciary duty to the Lummi Nation, rather than any express
regulatory provision, which mandates that the Corps consider
and protect the Tribe’s treaty-secured right to take fish at its
usual and accustomed places. At the same time, if a permitted
action will have only a de minimis effect on the exercise of
treaty rights or habitat, courts may deny relief.71
In a recent decision, the Army Corps of Engineers discussed
the de minimis standard when it denied a permit application
for a port facility (Cherry Point) near Bellingham, Washington,
which would receive and ship coal to Asian markets from the
Powder River Basin in Wyoming and Montana.
At full build out, the over-water impacts of the project
will include a trestle, wharf, three ship berths, and new
vessel approach lane covering 122 acres and handling
487 total annual vessel calls, one vessel arrival or
departure every 18 hours. This does not include the
incidental vessel traffic needed to operate a deep water
export facility of this magnitude. Therefore, at
minimum, 122 acres of the Lummi’s U&A fishing
grounds will be impacted by the proposed project by
eliminating the Lummi’s access to their U&A fishing
grounds.72
The Corps considered avoidance and minimization measures as
factors in whether the impacts are greater than de minimis,
but concluded that “this proposed regulation on the time and
manner of fishing at the U&A fishing ground is an impairment
or limitation [of treaty rights] that is only appropriate by an
act of Congress or for the conservation of the fishery
resource.”73 Accordingly the Corps may not issue the permit

71. Lummi Indian Nation v. Cunningham, No. C92-1023 (W.D. Wash. 1992). See,
e.g., United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 654 (9th Cir. 1998) (Upholding
District Judge Rafeedie’s ruling that tribal access across private land might be limited
in some circumstances. The “district court did not err by requiring the Tribes to prove
the unavailability of other forms of access before allowing them to cross private land.”
The “district court also [properly] invoked equitable principles to subject the Tribes’
Treaty shellfishing right to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions when the
right is exercised on the Growers’ or Owners’ property.”).
72. Memorandum for Record: Gateway Pacific Terminal Project and Lummi Nation’s
Usual and Accustomed Treaty Fishing Rights at Cherry Point, Whatcom County, at
28, Pacific International Holdings, LLC, NWS-2008-260 (U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs.,
May 9, 2016).
73. Id. at 31.
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unless Congress were to authorize impairment of the Lummi
Nation’s treaty rights – an action not likely to occur and one
that would raise Fifth Amendment takings issues.74
The habitat question was taken one logical step further in
litigation involving culverts that inhibited the ability of adult
salmon to return to their natal streams to spawn as adults,
and/or for smolts (juvenile salmon) to migrate to the ocean. In
the latest chapter of United States v. Washington,75 the Ninth
Ciruit court of appeals considered an action brought by treaty
tribes of western Washington in 2001, and joined in by the
United States as trustee. The court applied fundamental
techniques of treaty interpretation to reject the State of
Washington’s claim that the treaties contained no implied
protection for fisheries habitat.
In its brief, Washington characterizes the “treaties'
principal purpose” as ‘opening up the region to
settlement.’ Brief at 29. Opening up the Northwest for
white settlement was indeed the principal purpose of
the United States. But it was most certainly not the
principal purpose of the Indians. Their principal
purpose was to secure a means of supporting
themselves once the Treaties took effect. Salmon were a
central concern. An adequate supply of salmon was “not
much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than
the atmosphere they breathed.’ Winans, 198 U.S. at
381.”76
The court concluded that “The Indians did not understand . . .
that they would have access to their usual and accustomed
fishing places, but with a qualification that would allow the
government to diminish or destroy the fish runs. Governor
Stevens did not make . . . such a cynical and disingenuous
promise.77 The court accordmng upheld the district court’s
injunction mandating that the State of Washington repair
salmon-bolcking culverts over a seventeen year period.78

74. See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (abrogation of treaty
rights required payment of compensation for property taken).
75. United States v. Washington, No. 13-35474, 2016 WL 3517884 (9th Cir. June 27,
2016).
76. Id. at *10.
77. Id.
78. Id. at *23.
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The “culvert litigation” is an excellent example of how the
federal-tribal relationship can work to protect treaty rights and
associated habitat from undue degradation by a third party—
the State of Washington. In the case of climate change and
ocean acidification, however, the problem is not readily
targeted by discreet litigation because the primary cause is
emission of carbon dioxide.79 The problem is pervasive and
world-wide in nature. Still the federal government should take
action to minimize emissions and thus avoid even more harm
to treaty resources and habitat.
IV. LINKING THE TRUST RESPONSIBILITY, INDIAN
TREATY RIGHTS, AND THE PROBLEM OF OCEAN
ACIDIFICATION.
This section summarizes the rules set out above and argues
that in light of the potential devastation caused by climate
change and ocean acidification, the federal government must
do more than just follow those rules and policies. To be sure
the United States, as it acts through its various agencies, must
consider the effects of administrative actions on Indian treaty
rights, and the habitat that treaty resources rely upon. And
federal law does not permit adverse impacts on treaty rights
absent express congressional authorization. Moreover, every
federal agency must consider any activity it might permit in
light of the overall effect of any proposed project. Agency
actions affecting tribal interests must take place in
consultation with the affected tribes, and be consistent with
the federal government’s trust responsibility.80 The Army
Corps of Engineers followed these rules well in its recent
decision to reject the application for a coal terminal in
Washington State.81 On the other hand, the important issue of
whether the coal industry should continue to be encouraged as
a matter of policy was not addressed in the decision because
the narrow question before the Corps was the likelihood of

79. Robin Kundis Craig, supra note 5, at 1654.
80. Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 § 3(a) (Nov. 6, 2000) (“Agencies shall
respect Indian tribal self-government and sovereignty, honor tribal treaty and other
rights, and strive to meet the responsibilities that arise from the unique legal
relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribal governments.”).
81. See discussion supra notes 70–72.
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unlawful physical interference with Indian treaty rights.82
However, the effect of the decision is to deprive, or at least
hinder the export of coal that would lead to increased
greenhouse gas emissions.83 One commentator noted that
“more is at stake [than treaty rights], namely the rising costs
of climate change and the need to keep as much carbon in the
ground as possible. Coal is one of the worst contributors to
greenhouse gases and the notion of ‘clean coal’ is, at least for
now, another example of techno-narcissism.”84
The Obama Administration did establish a pause in further
federal coal leasing in January 2016 pending further review.
Secretary Jewell’s Order highlighted climate impacts.
Concerns about Climate Change. The second broad
category of concerns about the Federal coal program
relates to its impacts on climate change. The United
States has pledged to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to reduce its
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 26-28 percent
below 2005 levels by 2025. The Obama Administration
has made, and is continuing to make, unprecedented
efforts to reduce GHG emissions in line with this target
through numerous measures. Numerous scientific
studies indicate that reducing GHG emissions from coal
use worldwide is critical to addressing climate change.
At the same time, as noted above, the Federal coal
program is a significant component of overall United
States’ coal production. Federal coal represents
approximately 41 percent of the coal produced in the
United States, and when combusted, it contributes
roughly 10 percent of the total U.S. GHG emissions.
Many stakeholders highlighted the tension between
producing very large quantities of Federal coal while
pursuing policies to reduce U.S. GHG emissions
substantially, including from coal combustion.85

82. Id.
83. See Lynda V. Mapes, Tribes prevail, kill proposed coal terminal at Cherry Point,
THE SEATTLE TIMES, http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/tribesprevail-kill-proposed-coal-terminal-at-cherry-point (last visited May 11, 2016).
84. John Talton, Coal’s moment of truth at Cherry Point, THE SEATTLE TIMES, http://
www.seattletimes.com/business/economy/coals-moment-of-truth-at-cherry-point/ (last
visited May 11, 2016).
85. Order, 3338 at 4 (Dept. of the Interior, January 15, 2016) (Order by the Secretary
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As all of the articles in this book note, there are very few
effective technical or legal tools for controlling ocean
acidification. There must be dramatic declines in greenhouse
gas emissions simply to slow the process down. The Secretarial
Order is a step in the right direction.
The burden of ocean acidification will fall heavily on Indian
tribes with treaty rights to marine and freshwater resources.
As Quinault Tribal Chairperson Fawn Sharp stated, “We’ve
witnessed the desecration of our ocean being polluted by
greenhouse gases through acidification, causing the food chain
for salmon and other sacred natural resources to dwindle.86
The federal government’s general trust responsibility to Indian
tribes, coupled with its power and obligation to protect treaty
resources, can result in incidental actions that may slow
greenhouse gas emissions like the permit denial at Cherry
Point. These same authorities support a larger “Indian trust”
effort to reduce the causes of ocean acidification, just as
Professor Wood argues in her article.87 At bottom, however, I
am skeptical that courts will play an effective role in enforcing
the obligation that the federal government has to protect
treaty resources by limiting emissions. This is a world-wide
problem that can only be curbed by a shift from fossil fuels to
alternatives. The broader trust environmental trust litigation
advanced by Professor Wood can directly aid the tribal trust
theories, but it is hard to see litigation leading directly to
success in the effort-because it can be in a suit to prevent
damage caused to fisheries by poorly constructed or
maintained culverts. Instead, enlightened policy makers
should rely on Indian trust principles and treaty rights to
buttress arguments favoring policies such as the federal
moratorium on coal leasing. As noted above, Presidential
Executive Orders already require agencies to take protective
actions regarding Indian treaty rights, and to consult with
Indian tribes when tribal interests may be affected.88 It would
be a small step to include tribal rights to functioning marine
and freshwater environments as factors that help guide the

of the Interior re. Discretionary Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement to
Modernize the Federal Coal Program).
86. Sharp, supra note 4.
87. See supra note 6.
88. See supra note 80.
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United States to greatly reduce its greenhouse gas emissions
and lead the world in that effort as well.
Efforts to curb ocean acidification will take a concerted effort
using all the tools described in the various chapters of this
book. The special obligations owed by the United States to
Indigenous Nations that are now part of the national fabric
should compel strong domestic federal action and international
leadership to fight the environmental harm caused by carbon
emissions and ocean acidification.

